



House of
**Energy Markets
& Finance**

Decision on electric vehicle charging tariffs: Investigating the trade-off between system friendliness and convenience'

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8th Workshop on Experimental Economics for the Environment
Bochum, 12.07.2023

UN | IT | E²

Gefördert durch:



Bundesministerium
für Wirtschaft
und Klimaschutz

aufgrund eines Beschlusses
des Deutschen Bundestages

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Offen im Denken

Motivation

1

Design

2

Method (empirical)

3

Method (survey)

4

Embedding of experiment in broader project context

5

Discussion

6

- **Problems of system operators**

- Growing peak demand
- Sector coupling
- Renewable integration (E-Transition)

- **Reasons for problems:**

- Imbalance between financial costs supply & price actually paid by customers

- **(Theoretical) solution**

- Cost reflective pricing - price signals to shift demand
- Improved network efficiency, reduced infrastructure costs, and lower average market prices, reduced risk (producer) & demand
- Active control (optimized, smart charging – third party access)

Utility from System perspective



Utility from Consumer perspective



Standard Tariff

Passive Control Tariff

Direct Control Tariff

1. Do consumers prefer simple electric vehicle charging tariffs over more complex ones?
2. If yes, how can we change their preferences towards overall beneficial tariffs?

- **Perspective of consumers, i.e., households**


- Cognitive biases in decision making process – *principle of simplicity*
- Use of heuristics and “short-cuts” and rule of thumbs → be satisfied, even if result is economically not optimal
- Consumer prefer standard tariffs

- **Observation (to date)**

- Cost-reflective pricing
 - low uptake rates
 - Users are (to date) a unique small subset
 - Possible price inelasticity (high level of optimization)
- Active control
 - Preferences for active control rather than flat-rate and cost-reflective for **static applications**
 - loss of control is outweighed by the gain in convenience
 - No generalisation because acceptance of automated devices is highly appliance-specific

- Discrete choice model
 - Software: Sawtooth
 - Recruitment in University*, via Social Networks (Strommarktgruppe etc.)
 - ~ 330 respondents
 - Concepts per choice task = 3 (No opt out)
 - Choice tasks in study = 7
 - Reward via lottery
 - Stated preferences / May I assume a hypothetical situation? -> Discussion
 - Possible treatment: Social norms (social comparison), information given by public authorities, framing, default settings

Work in progress



| Attributes | Levels | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | Grundpreis: 20 € p.M. Arbeitspreis: 0,30 €/kWh | Grundpreis: 20 € p.M. | | Grundpreis: 20 € p.M. | | | Grundpreis: 20 € p.M. | | Grundpreis: 20 € p.M. exakter Marktpreis ist zeitabhängig ¹ |
| Pricing scheme | Arbeitspreis: Tag (07-19) 0,40 €/kWh | Arbeitspreis: Nacht (19-07) 0,20 €/kWh | Arbeitspreis: M (07-15) 0,40 €/kWh | Arbeitspreis: D (15-23) 0,30 €/kWh | Arbeitspreis: N (23-07) 0,20 €/kWh | Arbeitspreis: Tag (07-19) 0,40 €/kWh | Arbeitspreis: Nacht (19-07) Exakter Marktpreis* | | |
| Control mode | Owner | + Contractor | | - | | | - | | - |
| Contractor | Electricity discounter | Municipal utilities | | National electricity producer | | | - | | - |
| Discount | 0% ^{2,3} | 5% ³ | | 10% ³ | | | 15% ³ | | - |
| Priority charging (SoC +Contractor) | 0% | 20% | | 40% | | | - | | |
| Yrl. Costs | Depending on the stated mileage from prior question | | | | | | | | |

We would set the focus on unidirectional charging

* Kind of classroom experiment
**DSOs, OEMs, Universities and research institutes

¹The estimated value is on average 0,XX €/kWh (graph)
- Day/Night (SS/WS, WE/WW)

²This value applies for DumbTarif (status quo)

³Discount for performance of complex tariffs to status quo tariff

– Sociodemographics:

- Age, gender, education, income, occupation, marital status, geographic location, household size
- Questions regarding (E-)mobility, smart home, smart technologies

- Random Utility Model (RUM) theory

- Part-worth utility estimation*

$$U_{jm} = \beta_j X_m + \varepsilon_{jm}$$

- Where

- U_{jm} = utility plus random error for the j_{th} respondent and m_{th} alternative
- β_j = vector of part-worth utilities for respondent j
- X_m = vector of design codes describing alternative m
- ε_{jm} = IID (Independent and Identically Distributed) rightskewed Gumbel distributed random variable

- WTP estimation

$$WTP = -\frac{\beta_j}{\beta_{\text{price}}}$$

*We might control for “left-right effect” by using alternative specific constant (asc)

- Multinomial Logit

$$P_i = \frac{e^{U_i}}{\sum_{k=1}^K e^{U_i + \dots + U_k}}, \text{ where}$$

- P_i = probability of choosing alternative i ;
- U_i = utility of the i th alternative;

- Latent Class Choice Model

$$P_n(i) = \sum_{s=1}^S P_n(i|s) Q_n(s), \text{ where}$$

- $P_n(i)$ = probability of individual n choosing alternative i ;
- $Q_n(s)$ = probability of individual n belonging to latent class s ;
- $P_n(i|s)$ = probability of individual n choosing alternative i given n belonging to class s ;
- S = number of latent classes ;

- Hierarchical Bayesian Estimation

- ability to obtain respondent-level utilities
- appropriate for choice models when respondents are faced with multiple choice tasks
- Two (hierarchical levels)
 - Upper level: Assumption that individuals’ part-worths are described by a multivariate normal distribution (vector of means and matrix of covariances)
 - Lower level: Assumption given an individual’s part-worths, that his probabilities of choosing particular alternatives are governed by MNL

■ Survey Structure

1. Introduction
2. Storyline and information (definitions)
3. Now try to put yourself in the following (fictitious) situation
4. Parking space, wallbox and car
5. Rel. time charging at home overnight
6. Driving profile
7. CBC
8. Sociodemographic
9. Link for participation in lottery


Wenn Sie nur diese Optionen hätten, welche würden Sie wählen?


(1 of 7)

| | | | |
|----------------------------|---|--|---|
| Bepreisungsmodi | Grundpreis 20 € p.M. Arbeitspreis: 07-19 Uhr 0,40 €/kWh 19-07 Uhr 0,20 €/kWh | Exakter Marktpreis ist zeitabhängig Durchschnittlich liegt der Preis bei: Sommer Tag XX €/kWh / Nacht XX €/kWh Winter Tag XX €/kWh / Nacht XX €/kWh | Grundpreis 20 € p.M. Arbeitspreis 0,30 €/kWh |
| Steuerungsmodus | durch Nutzer ausschließlich | durch Nutzer & Vertragspartner | durch Nutzer & Vertragspartner |
| Anbieter/Vertragsp | Strombilliganbieter (Discounter) | Nationale Stromversorger | Strombilliganbieter (Discounter) |
| Bonuszahlung (jährlich) | bis zu 10% | bis zu 5% | bis zu 0% |
| Ladestrategie/ -zustand | 40% | 0% | 0% |
| Preis | 516.096 | 516.096 | 460.8 |
| | <input type="button" value="Auswahl"/> | <input type="button" value="Auswahl"/> | <input type="button" value="Auswahl"/> |

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Thank you for your attention

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